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Abstract— The gigantic complexity and heterogeneity of 
today’s advanced cyber-physical systems and systems of systems is 
multiplied by the use of avant-garde computing architectures to 
employ artificial intelligence based autonomy in the system. Here, 
the overall system’s reliability comes along with requirements for 
fail-safe, fail-operational modes specific to the target applications 
of the autonomous system and adopted HW architectures. The 
paper makes an overview of reliability challenges for intelligence 
implementation in autonomous systems enabled by HW 
backbones such as neuromorphic architectures, approximate 
computing architectures, GPUs, tensor processing units (TPUs) 
and SoC FPGAs.  
Keywords— reliability, safety, fault tolerance, autonomous 
systems, standards. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Recent rapid expansion of autonomous systems has enabled 
numerous unprecedented novel services and businesses. 
However, the unleashed benefits come along with 
computationally extremely challenging mission- and safety-
critical application scenarios. The gigantic complexity and 
heterogeneity of today’s advanced cyber-physical systems and 
systems of systems is multiplied by the use of avant-garde 
computing architectures to employ artificial intelligence based 
autonomy in the system. The setups such as swarms of 
autonomous robotic vehicles are already on the doorstep and 
call for novel intelligent approaches for reliability that are often 
the key enabling factor for a new product or technology on the 
way to market. This success is supported by the connectivity 
solutions being developed in the IoT research discipline that is 
also moving towards enhanced autonomy of the connected 
intelligence-enabled things [1]. 
Expectations for reliability are very wide as also the variety of 
autonomous systems. The latter are driven by a number of killer 
applications listed below: 
 autonomous vehicles in the automotive domain is the 
dominant application in terms of funding and recent research 
efforts invested, includes cars with Autonomous Driving 
(AD) through levels 3 to 5 of autonomy;   
 aircrafts with different degree of autonomy, e.g. employing 
the ‘fly-by-wire’ reliability-critical systems; 
 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) commonly known as 
drones, both fixed-wing and rotary (quadcopters), these days 
are equipped with very high degree of intelligence  and tend 
to operate autonomously individually or in UAV swarms 
(autonomous System of systems);   
 unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) include among others 
rapidly developing self-driving delivery robots (e.g. [2]) and 
farming robots; 
 unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs), e.g. robotic fishes, 
and unmanned boats (also unmanned surface vessel (USV)) 
are heading at long-term operation in harsh environments;   
 autonomous spacecrafts such as satellites and autonomous 
landers for remote missions  often with limited 
communication capabilities; 
 autonomous military and law enforcement applications, e.g. 
that may be dual use of the above mentioned systems but also 
specific weapons, e.g. autonomous missiles.  
Today, autonomous systems are quickly getting on top of the 
hype cycle [3] and several very recent studies have started to 
look into the enabling aspects of such systems, e.g. from the 
standards perspective [4], from the security perspective [5], or 
for a specific application [6]. In this paper, we make an 
overview of reliability challenges in autonomous systems. The 
rest of this paper is organized as follows.  Section II outlines the 
challenging attributes of autonomous systems. Section III and 
IV target at understanding industrial standards and the key 
concepts in reliability and safety for autonomous systems 
Sections V and VI analyze specific requirements introduced by 
novel applications and architectures and Section VII discusses 
reliability enhancement. Section VIII wraps up the paper.  
II. AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS’ ATTRIBUTES FROM THE 
RELIABILITY PERSPECTIVE 
The attributes of an autonomous system (AS) from the 
reliability requirements perspective may be summarized in the 
following set of challenges: 
External attributes: 
a. Specific application domains and operating environments, 
i.e. dangerous, tedious, remote/hardly- or in-accessible for 
human involvement; 
b. Limited availability and latency of external support for 
repair or critical decision-making; 
c. Real-time constraints (often hard real time); 
d. An AS is usually a cyber-physical system immersed into 
physical world through intensive interaction by sensors 
(also implying sensor fusion) and actuators [7];  
e. Often, several ASs are combined into a System of Systems 
(SoS) [8] with intensive machine-to-machine 
communication and resource sharing, enabling computing 
continuum and complex distributed computing 
architectures, e.g. edge-to-fog computing;  
f. An AS imply subjectively higher expectations to reliability 
level and lower tolerance to unsafe behavior compared to a 
human-operated system. 
Internal attributes: 
g. High complexity of the computing architectures capable to 
run computation-intensive evolvable artificial intelligence 
software (e.g. the novel GPUs, the TPU for Google’s 
TensorFlow and similar);  
h. Specificity of Hardware Neural Networks implementations 
that are rather a “sea of elements”, with reduced 
structural/functional modularization of hardware;  
i. ASs are built utilizing a combination of many very new 
untested in-field technologies;  
j. An AS implementation has strong dependency on the 
quality of assumptions about the ambient, often dynamic 
and uncertain environment.  
The state-of-the-art academic solutions, e.g. [9],[10],[11], are 
either incapable or inefficient to tackle this union of challenges. 
The practical reliability drivers in today’s designs are industrial 
standards in different application domains such as [12] and its 
application-specific derivatives, e.g. [13], that do not address 
cross-layer approaches. The standards mostly address 
functional safety of the complete system rather than just a 
component and depend on the integrated operation of all 
sensors, actuators, control devices, and other units. Therefore, 
the functional safety standards are usually unspecific to the 
solutions at the integrated circuit (IC) level. The standard for IC 
stress test [14] in the automotive domain covers requirements 
for a subset of reliability issues (such as NBTI, HCI, 
electromigration, etc.) at the chip level. However, many recent 
application domains unleashed by the unmanned systems, e.g. 
UAVs, remain uncovered [15],[16]. 
III. UNDERSTANDING RELIABILITY STANDARDS IN 
AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS 
Autonomous systems will enable huge societal changes (and 
possibly progress). As expected, stringent safety and reliability 
expectations and requirements are firmly set in international 
standards, implicit customer expectations and, not 
unexpectedly, insurance policies. Autonomous systems are also 
an emerging industrial field and are very likely to stay with us 
for a very long time. Accordingly, it is very probable that many 
successive, evolutionary or revolutionary standards will be 
issued to govern them. International standards are the clearest 
and most authoritative prescribers regarding reliability and 
safety.  The list of current or under-development standards in 
this field includes:  
 IEC 61508 [12] (Functional Safety of 
Electrical/Electronic/Programmable Electronic Safety-
related Systems) is aimed at all industrial fields and is the 
template for many application-specific standards;  
 One of the most well-known derivatives of the previous is 
ISO 26262 [13], which addresses the functional safety of 
automotive systems;  
 IEC 62279 is an adaptation of [12] for railway applications;  
 ISO 13849 [17] is a safety standard which applies to parts 
of machinery control systems that are assigned to provide 
safety functions;  
 AC 25.1309-1A [18] (System Design and Analysis) 
provides background for important concepts and issues 
within airplane system design and analysis;  
 RTCA/DO-254 [19] (Design Assurance Guidance for 
Airborne Electronic Hardware) provides guidance for the 
development of airborne electronic hardware.  
Since change is a permanent feature of the industrial progress, 
expectations and requirements constantly evolve. While 
intended to be robust and durable, standards are not safe from 
being prone to latest fashions and currents in the industry or 
from being influenced by companies and organizations looking 
to promote their own position and offering.  
Particularly, the terminology and dictionary of any standard is 
a faithful snapshot of the particular context at the time of the 
writing and often suffers from updates, changes of signification, 
meaning overcharges and obsoleteness during the expected 
lifetime of a standard and even more so when a new standard is 
devised. The goal of this Section is to pinpoint some basic 
topics that are common to the different standards and faced by 
most of them. They are summarized in Table I. 
Many standards include a part related to Terminology. In this 
category, the signification and a clear definition of the key 
terms shall be presented and elaborated. However, the specific 
meaning can hide behind an ordinary word, requiring a more in-
depth discussion and explanation and investing the simple term 
with a fundamental weight. The “Terminology” category would 
thus benefit from a Concepts sub-category. 
As soon as the key terms and concepts have been introduced, 
the standards are fast to move to the explanation of their core 
methodology, framework and principles. The Methodology 
category covers these aspects. In their various proposed 
methodologies, many of the standards address “risks” to the 
safety of the intended applications and set a mix of quantitative 
and qualitative requirements and expectations for these risks. 
These objectives and goals will be captured in the Requirements 
category. The reliability and safety of any application will have 
to be checked against the applicable requirements and improved 
TABLE I.  MAIN TOPICS IN THE RELIABILITY AND FUNCTIONAL SAFETY STANDARDS  
Terminology Methodology Requirements Assessment Management Environment
Vocabulary 
Concepts 
Development: 
System-level 
Hardware-level 
Software-level 
Hazard & Risks 
Classification 
Event rates 
Mitigation 
Models 
Probabilistic 
Simulation 
Online 
Offline 
Diagnostic 
Maintenance 
Electrical 
Thermal 
Mechanical 
Radiation  
 
until its behavior fulfils the expectations of the intended 
standard. Accordingly, the taxonomy will have to include the 
Assessment and Management categories. 
Lastly, any application is designed to work safely and reliably 
in a given setting. The Environment category would capture the 
entirety of electrical, thermal, mechanical, radiative conditions 
to which the application will be subjected.  
In practice, the concerns about reliability may mix together with 
those about feasibility (especially when target features are 
particularly challenging). For this reason, independently on 
standards and regulations, general safety praxis can be utilized 
e.g. by using the ALARP method (“as low as reasonably 
practicable”) and providing justification for benefits of the 
society against the involved risks. 
IV. KEY CONCEPTS IN RELIABILITY AND FUNCTIONAL SAFETY 
FOR AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS 
For autonomous systems, but not only, the notions of 
“reliability” and “safety” comprise as many significations as 
engineers from different industries want to invest in them. 
Loosely, reliability represents the probability of a system to fail, 
i.e. higher reliability means less failures, while safety generally 
means that the system fails in a safe way. A reliable system can 
be unsafe while a safe system can be unreliable. Furthermore, 
systems can be made arbitrarily safe and reliable with a 
corresponding investment of resources and time. Requirements 
for reliability and safety can be quantitatively and qualitatively 
very different but standards are often aggressive in setting high 
requirements for both safety and reliability. The most 
straightforward approach to address both reliability and safety 
is to rank risks and hazards according to their impact (safety) 
and to expect that the probability of risks (reliability) decreases 
inversely to their impact. An aggregated event rate (often 
measured in terms of Failure in Time, or FIT), may be 
associated to the system and/or component according to their 
role but with an underlying understanding of the risks that make 
up the “Failure” key term.  
In this way, quantity and quality, safety and reliability are 
harmoniously integrated. However, reliability engineers will 
find that this task is relatively difficult as two opposing concepts 
still need to be conciliated: objective versus subjective. The 
qualificative of “Objective” can be applied to any physical 
measurements. As an example, technology fault rates can be 
expressed accurately; a “Soft Error Rate” is an objective 
measurement of the susceptibility of a technological process 
under radiations. Faults propagate through the circuit and 
system and can become Failures. Various methods, such as 
static and dynamic ones, can accurately and undisputedly (thus 
objectively) predict the fact that a fault occurring in a deeply-
embedded logic cell instance can propagate and affect a primary 
system output. The question that the reliability engineers and 
their design colleagues must answer now is whether this fault 
consequence represents a failure or not, what are the actual 
consequences and, more importantly, where exactly in terms of 
risk levels the failure needs to be classified. This is the 
“Subjective” part and standards try to address this by a 
prescriptive, function-based assessment. However, in practice, 
the whole procedure provides some freedom and margins to 
reliability engineers that can argue for a less critical 
classification of possible fault outcomes.  
 
Probabilistic risk evaluation and management is a core concept 
of many reliability assessments. Only a fraction of 
technological faults will propagate through the circuit and 
become errors, i.e., erroneous data or values stored instead of 
correct information. Only a percentage of errors will become 
failures causing observable deviations of the system behaviour. 
Furthermore, failures can be classified in criticality classes. If 
error detection/correction/management features are 
implemented, they can address faults, errors and failures at any 
design level and can reduce the percentage of events graduating 
from one level to the upper one (see Fig. 1). 
A first, fundamental contributor to the quality of an autonomous 
system is the quality of the underlying implementation 
technology. The manufacturing process must present a well-
characterized, preferably low intrinsic defect and fault rate, 
resiliency to environmental challenges and a good, well known 
aging and degradation performance. Moreover, the technology 
providers (foundries) must offer their customers a full 
ecosystem with the tools, IPs and solutions for reliable and safe 
circuit design. 
A second contributor lies in integrating into the system some 
solutions for lifetime performance assurance. The classical 
bathtub curve is no longer an evidence and the reliability of the 
system must be managed during the expected lifetime through 
online and offline monitoring, embedded sensors, test 
instruments and safety mechanisms (see Fig. 2). 
Configurability and Adaptability, to environment and workload 
challenges, as well as to intrinsic degradation and aging, are 
Fig. 1. Faults, errors and failures in a system 
Fig. 2. Managed lifetime reliability (courtesy of the RESIST project). 
important for today’s autonomous systems running dynamic 
applications in diverse environments. 
Lastly, the evolution to “Self-” Everything (self-monitoring, 
self-calibration, self-adaptation, self-configuration, etc.) is an 
important industry trend and goal that can provide solutions for 
more reliable and safer autonomous systems.  
V. NOVEL AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS’ APPLICATION-SPECIFIC 
REQUIREMENTS FOR RELIABILITY VALIDATION 
 Fig 3. The three clusters of application requirements in autonomous systems 
The plethora of new applications unleashed by autonomous 
systems introduce novel or bring to the front existing 
requirements for the system reliability validation. These can be 
represented in the following three clusters as shown in Fig. 3.  
A. Diversity 
One of the main challenges for the autonomy is the diversity of 
the environment and operational conditions. A solution to 
simplify the problem is to split it to a limited (countable) 
number of Operational Design Domains (ODD), e.g. as 
introduced by the NHTSA agency. Considering a particular 
autonomous system, these may include such factors as 
operational terrain, environmental and weather conditions, 
communication modes, etc. [23].  
Proper reliability validation implies capturing real world 
scenarios along with real failure modes that may imply a 
significant amount of statistical data collected. For example, the 
calculations in [24] demonstrate that this results in billions of 
miles of in-field test. This approach is also valid for any-scale 
safety-critical autonomous systems, e.g. UGVs [2].  
The implementation of a complex autonomous system or even 
a system of systems may involve a diversity of available fault 
tolerance structures in the components employed, e.g. 
involving COTS parts along with hardened ones. Moreover, as 
mentioned in the above section, the diversity of autonomous 
systems is amplified by their features, such self-adaptability 
and self-configuration. 
B. Complexity 
Autonomous systems have introduced a conceptually new level 
of complexity for reliability validation. Here, application of 
artificial intelligence algorithms is the main factor for the rapid 
increase of complexity in HW architectures (see Section VI). 
This includes in particular smart distribution of computation 
and related advanced heterogeneous communication schemes.   
Both system’s mission tasks and decision-making autonomy 
imply complexity for enabling sensor fusion from a multitude 
of integrated diverse sensors.  
Vehicle-to-vehicle communication (V2V) has enabled efficient 
autonomy in complex dynamic networks of machines, e.g. 
heterogeneous swarms, at the price of very large overall 
systems’ complexity.  
Today, the industrial classification of autonomous systems’ ICs 
in million gates (MG) assumes the following ranges: small-
scale design <32MG; medium-scale <200MG; large-scale 
>200MG. 
C. Integrity 
The main system integrity requirements brought to the front by 
autonomous systems use the self-monitoring and corresponding 
self-awareness that became a must and significantly support 
reliability enhancement. To cope with the diversity and 
complexity of environments the concepts such as responsibility-
sensitive safety and safety of the intended functionality (SOTIF) 
[4] target at the autonomous system misuse cases and establish 
framework for responsibility sharing.  
The challenge of high-severity failures in the system often 
dictates the requirement of the system to be fail-safe or even 
fail-operational thus also establishing diverse reliability 
requirements for modules to be available in the degraded mode. 
Here the complete system may benefit in some cases from the 
swarming of agents when the mission tasks can be re-allocated 
and accomplished even if some agent fails.  
Finally, reliability validation is challenged by interference with 
requirements by other design aspects [20], [21] and correlation 
with security requirements in particular (e.g. [22] by ACEA 
association). For example, a new security standard under 
development (ISO 21434) is aiming at defining a Cybersecurity 
Assurance Level (CAL), similar to the ASIL concept [13]. 
VI. CHALLENGES BY NOVEL HW ARCHITECTURES 
In most cases, the requirements specified for autonomous 
systems cannot be fulfilled without resorting to advanced 
computing architectures and semiconductor technologies. 
Concerning the architectures, this means that conventional 
CPU-based ones are substituted by alternative ones, including 
not only multicore devices, but also special modules, such as 
General-Purpose Graphic Processing Units (GPGPUs). Since 
Artificial Intelligence is widely used in autonomous systems, 
accelerators specifically targeting neural networks, such as the 
Tensor Processing Units, or TPUs, by Google, are intensively 
investigated and increasingly adopted. Complex innovative 
architectures such as the massively parallel, low-precision 
floating-point compute Intelligence Processing Unit (IPU) [25] 
require the smallest technology nodes to allow the necessary 
density of transistors bringing along the atomic scale reliability 
challenges. Finally, for some applications it may be convenient 
to include in the architecture some FPGA modules able to 
provide the flexibility to dynamically change the hardware 
supporting the implemented functions. All the mentioned 
components may be used as single devices or integrated into 
even more complex Systems on Chip (SoCs). 
Moving from conventional architectures to the mentioned ones 
rises several important issues, not only in terms of hardware 
design complexity (e.g. in terms of validation) and software 
development and qualification, but also in terms of getting a 
sufficient understanding of their sensitivity to possible faults. 
Diversity 
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Real use scenarios 
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While several theoretical and experimental analysis provided 
information about the Architecture Vulnerability Factor [26] of 
traditional architectures [27], only preliminary results have 
been provided concerning the new ones and about the main 
modules they are composed of [28],[29],[30]. Moreover, these 
analyses are currently made more complex by the difficulty in 
getting representative open source models for the new 
architectures [31]. Similarly, the impact of possible faults 
affecting the new architectures when executing some common 
kinds of applications used in autonomous systems (e.g. those 
related to video processing and to neural networks 
implementation) is only partly understood [32].  
On the other side, the requirements in terms of complexity, 
speed, power consumption and miniaturization force the 
adoption of advanced semiconductor technologies. Even if we 
stick to CMOS technologies, those that are going to be used for 
autonomous systems are widely unknown in terms of reliability. 
Hence, their adoption in safety-critical applications (as those of 
autonomous vehicles often are) asks first for effectively 
developing new fault models, given that the currently adopted 
ones are largely unsuitable to deal with the new defects 
characterizing these technologies. Secondly, solutions to detect 
and possibly tolerate these faults should be identified, taking 
into account that they should be able to trade-off their 
effectiveness with several other parameters, including cost and 
time-to-market. Finally, even when solutions will be available, 
their adoption will be possible only if EDA tools supporting 
them in a fully integrated manner with respect to the design and 
test flow will exist.   
All the above issues are likely to become even more critical 
when non Von Neumann architectures and post-CMOS 
technologies will start to be adopted [33].  
VII. RELIABILITY ENHANCEMENT 
This Section aims at briefly summarizing some crucial points 
related to the current status of the art in the area of solutions 
able to achieve the required level of reliability when the 
electronic part of autonomous systems is considered. 
As explained in the previous Sections, ASs are likely to expand 
significantly in the next years, provided that some of the 
technical and organization issues we are summarizing will be 
successfully overcome. Since now, we can imagine some trends 
that may be followed in the next future, based on what is 
happening in some representative and more advanced domains 
within the wide area of ASs, such as the automotive one. 
Since the adopted technologies are intrinsically less reliable, a 
first trend goes into the direction of developing solutions at the 
architecture level that may guarantee by construction the target 
level of reliability. Solutions based on Duplication With 
Comparison (DWG), such as lockstep, are increasingly adopted 
when fault detection is the main target [34]. Unfortunately, their 
extension to the new architectures described in Section VI is not 
straightforward, although similar solutions implemented at the 
software level have been successfully explored already, 
especially with regular structures such as those of GPGPUs. 
Clearly, the adoption of hardware DWG architectures requires 
the development of specific products targeting safety-critical 
applications, only. Some recent products (e.g. Xavier by 
NVIDIA) go in this direction. Other products (e.g. the solution 
named Split-Lock introduced by ARM), although based on 
more conventional architectures, allow the user to dynamically 
decide whether to use the available redundancy to increase 
performance or reliability.  
Given the high cost of solutions able to tolerate faults resorting 
to hardware redundancy (e.g., based on Triple Modular 
Redundancy, or TMR), alternative solutions exploiting 
reconfiguration seem particularly attractive [35],[36]. In 
particular, they may provide a mechanism to extend the lifetime 
of adopted circuits, whose span is quickly shrinking in 
advanced technologies, and tends to be increasingly dependent 
on the operating environment and workload [37]. Additionally, 
the new technologies may increase the chance that multiple 
faults occur in a logic block, as it already happens for memory 
ones, and this may increase the negative impact of fault 
accumulation, which can hardly be managed via TMR. 
Reconfiguration can be applied at different levels and managed 
either directly in hardware, or resorting to Operating System 
features. In all cases, suitable techniques able to quickly detect 
(and possibly locate) faults are crucial. Existing Design for 
Testability structures (e.g. supporting Logic BIST for chunks of 
logic, or Memory BIST for memory modules) already 
introduced to support end-of-manufacturing test may be re-used 
for this purpose. In other cases users resort to functional 
solutions, e.g. based on the so-called Self-Test Libraries [38], 
which rely on the Software-based Self-test approach [39],[40]. 
This solution seems particularly effective for in-field test of 
complex systems, since it allows to exploit self-test code 
provided by the developer of the modules composing the 
system and able to achieve a given fault coverage, which is 
integrated by the user into the application code and run when 
required to achieve the target reliability figures (e.g., at the 
Power-On, or periodically, or when specific error conditions 
happen). The results produced by the system when executing 
such pieces of code allow the detection of possible faults [41]. 
Preliminary results show that the same approach can be 
extended also to new architectures, such as GPGPUs [42].  
Another interesting research direction which is proving to be 
promising for autonomous systems lies in trading-off precision 
with reliability. Preliminary results about techniques where 
hardware resources saved by moving to a lower precision are 
used to increase reliability are shown in [43].  
Given the complexity of the systems, we are targeting, in most 
cases they will integrate components designed and produced by 
different companies. Hence, cross-layer approaches to 
reliability are highly promising [44], but require a clear 
definition of what each level should guarantee in terms of 
reliability, and how this can be validated. 
It is worth mentioning that ASs are characterized by a wide 
variety of scenarios and constraints. In some of them, different 
and highly independent systems will cooperate to achieve a 
given target (Systems of Systems, or SoSs). In such cases, new 
paradigms may emerge even from the point of view of 
reliability. The complexity and heterogeneity of the resulting 
SoS may favor the adoption of holistic solutions which will 
enable it to implement highly innovative features, such as self-
reconfiguration, self-test, and implicit robustness.  
As a final comment, we would like to emphasize the already 
mentioned increasing importance of security for autonomous 
systems [5]. Several works highlighted that facing security 
often requires adopting solutions based on opposite strategies 
with respect to those required by reliability and test, e.g. in 
terms of system status observability. For this reason, integrated 
solutions identifying suitable trade-off between opposite 
constraints are required [45].  
VIII. CONCLUSIONS 
The paper has presented an overview of reliability challenges 
related to the novel and very rapidly developing domain of 
autonomous systems. The challenges of reliability assessment 
and enhancement stem from a set of general attributes, novel 
applications’ specific requirements and new hardware 
architectures of autonomous systems. The way forward for the 
research community and industry lays in understanding the new 
needs, collaboration towards comprehensive solutions and 
adoption of new appropriate standards.  
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